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Abstract 
 
General consensus exists that the adversarial nature of the 
South African criminal procedure with its often aggressive cross-
examination of a witness, sometimes by an accused himself, will 
in most cases expose a child to undue mental stress or suffering 
when having to testify in court. In confirmation of this fact and 
with a notion to shield child witnesses from the stress or suffering 
when having to testify in the presence of an accused the function 
of an intermediary was introduced with the insertion of section 
170A into the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. In terms of 
section 170A(1) a court may if it appears to such court that it 
would expose any witness under the biological or mental age of 
eighteen years to undue mental stress or suffering if he or she 
testified at such hearing, appoint a competent person as an 
intermediary in order for the witness to give evidence through 
that intermediary. Section 170A(1) contemplates that a child 
complainant will be assessed prior to testifying in court in order 
to determine whether the services of an intermediary should be 
used. If the assessment reveals that the services of an 
intermediary are needed, then the state must arrange for an 
intermediary to be available at the commencement of the trail. 
The aforementioned procedure of section 170A(1) was followed 
in Kerkhoff v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development 2011 2 SACR 109 (GP) and is the subject of this 
discussion. 
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1 Introduction 
General consensus prevails that the adversarial nature of the South African 
criminal procedure with its often aggressive cross-examination of a witness, 
sometimes by an accused himself or herself, will in most cases expose a 
child to undue mental stress or suffering when having to testify in court.1 In 
confirmation of this fact and with a view to shielding child witnesses from 
stress or suffering when having to testify in the presence of an accused, 
intermediaries were introduced into criminal procedures with the insertion of 
section 170A into the Criminal Procedure Act.2 Section 170A(1) of the Act 
provides that: 
Whenever criminal proceedings are pending before any court and it appears 
to such court that it would expose any witness under the biological or mental 
age of 18 years to undue mental stress or suffering if he or she testifies at 
such proceedings, the court may, subject to subsection (4) appoint a 
competent person as an intermediary in order to enable such witness to give 
his or her evidence through that intermediary. 
With the amendment of the Criminal Procedure Act the legislature 
recognised the difficult circumstances under which children have to testify 
and purported to ameliorate the difficulties experienced by them during such 
proceedings through the application of section 170A. This was confirmed by 
the Constitutional Court in DPP v Minister of Justice,3 where the court 
emphasised that the subsection had been enacted for the purpose of 
protecting a child complainant from undergoing undue mental stress or 
suffering that may be caused by testifying in court, and that this purpose is 
consistent with the principle that the best interests of children are of 
paramount importance in criminal trials involving child witnesses.4 
The Constitutional Court furthermore per Ngcobo J affirmed that: 
                                            
* Mildred Bekink. LLB (Unisa), LLM (Pret). Senior Lecturer at the Department of 
Mercantile Law, College of Law, University of South Africa. Email: 
bekinm@unisa.ac.za. 
1  Director of Public Prosecutions v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 
2009 4 SA 222 (CC) [108] (hereinafter referred to as DPP v Minster of Justice). Also 
see SALC Protection of the Child Witnesses; Schwikkard 1996 Acta Juridica 155; 
Müller 2000 CARSA 15-17; Matthias and Zaal 2011 Int'l J Child Rts 251. 
2  Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (hereinafter referred to as the Criminal Procedure 
Act, as amended by the Criminal Law Amendment Act 135 of 1991 and the Criminal 
Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007.) 
3  DPP v Minister of Justice para [95]. 
4  See s 28(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 hereinafter 
referred to as the Constitution. Note also the preamble of the Criminal Law (Sexual 
Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007, that acknowledges that 
children are among the most vulnerable members of society. 
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… it must be accepted that a child complainant in a sexual offence who 
testifies without the assistance of an intermediary faces a high risk of 
exposure to undue mental stress or suffering" and "that the object of 
s170A(1) read together with s170A(3) is precisely to prevent this risk 
of exposure. It does this by making provision for a child to testify 
through the intermediary.5 
The Constitutional Court pointed out that section 170A(1) does not require 
that a child first be exposed to undue mental stress or suffering before the 
section may be imposed. The section contemplates that a child complainant 
will be assessed prior to testifying in court in order to determine whether the 
services of an intermediary should be used. If the assessment reveals that 
the services of an intermediary are needed, then the state must arrange for 
an intermediary to be available at the commencement of the trail.6 The 
aforementioned procedure of section 170A(1) was followed in Kerkhoff v 
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2011 2 SACR 109 
(GP),7 which is the subject of this discussion. Aspects incidental to the 
procedure followed in section 170A(1), namely the confidentiality or not of 
the documents relating to the assessment itself, will also form part of this 
discussion. 
2 Facts 
The Kerkhoff case relates to a notice of motion in the North Gauteng High 
Court of South Africa in which the applicant (Kerkhoff) sought a variety of 
relief orders including that some of the respondents (the Minister of Safety 
and Security, the Director of Public Prosecutions, Advocate J Cronje and 
Captain Collin Morris of the Randburg SAPS) be found to be in contempt of 
court for failing to comply with certain previous court orders that had been 
granted. The applicant also sought an order directing the sixth respondent 
(the Teddy Bear Clinic) and the seventh respondent (Shaheda Omar, a 
social worker in the employ of the sixth respondent) to make the contents 
of the docket, such contents as were in their possession, and the documents 
listed in Annexure "A" attached to the notice of motion, available to the 
applicant.8 
The applicant in the matter, a Catholic priest, faced several criminal charges 
in the Brits Regional Court, including charges of sexual assault, charges of 
                                            
5  DPP v Minster of Justice para [109]. 
6  DPP v Minster of Justice paras [110]-[111]. 
7  Kerkhoff v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2011 2 SACR 109 (GP) 
(hereinafter referred to as Kerkhoff). 
8  Kerkhoff para [1]. 
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compelling or causing children to witness a sexual act, and also a charge of 
(common) assault. The state intended to call five complainants, all of them 
boys between the ages of ten and eleven, to testify against the applicant. 
The state also intended to use the provisions of section 170A of the Criminal 
Procedure Act to enable the five complainants to testify in the trial with the 
assistance of an intermediary. The intention of the state to apply the 
provisions of section 170A meant that at the commencement of the trial the 
state had to request the court to appoint an intermediary or intermediaries 
to assist the complainants to give evidence. In an effort to assist the court 
to make its decision regarding the appointment of an intermediary, the state 
obtained intermediary reports from the sixth respondent's employee, one 
Shaheda Omar, the seventh respondent, who was a qualified social worker. 
The seventh respondent recommended that the five complainants should 
testify through an intermediary.9 
The applicant, however, opposed the appointment of an intermediary to 
assist the complainants and wanted them to testify in open court without the 
protection that section 170A affords to children.10 The applicant indicated 
that he intended to attack the seventh respondent's assessment of the five 
children as well as her reports and that "the evidence of the five 
complainants is neither competent nor admissible".11 In order to achieve this 
outcome, the applicant sought access to the seventh respondent's working 
papers, which contained the raw data from which she compiled her reports. 
These documents were listed in Annexure "A" attached to the motion of 
notice. It should be noted that both the sixth and seventh respondents 
refused to make such data and documents available to either the 
prosecution or the defence as they considered them to be private and 
confidential.12 
The matter was subsequently brought before the North Gauteng High Court, 
which, apart from the matter concerning the contempt of court, was faced 
with the issue of whether the accused had a right to disclosure of the 
particular documentation, namely copies of the working papers containing 
the raw data from which the intermediary reports were compiled. In view of 
the court's decision, this discussion will focus on the courts' approach in 
addressing this issue in order to indicate whether an accused has a right to 
access to the said information. 
                                            
9  Kerkhoff para [4]. 
10  Kerkhoff para [4]. 
11  Kerkhoff para [4]. 
12  Kerkhoff paras [4], [12](11). 
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2.1 Sequence of events 
In order to have an understanding of the orders sought by the applicant it is 
necessary to have a broad view of the sequence of the events of the case. 
They can be briefly summarised as follows: 
 In February 2008 the applicant's attorney became aware of the fact 
that the applicant was being investigated for allegedly indecently 
assaulting four young boys who were members of his First 
Communion class. She instructed counsel and made contact with the 
investigating officer (the fifth respondent) in an attempt to have the 
case withdrawn. 
 The aforementioned approach was unsuccessful and on 5 June 2008 
the applicant was charged and appeared before the Brits District 
Court. The case was postponed for further investigation and for the 
state to obtain intermediary reports. 
 On 12 June 2008 the applicant applied to the Brits District Court for 
an order that the whole police docket (ie section A, B and C) be 
disclosed to the applicant. This order was granted. 
 On 12 August 2008 the applicant appeared before the Brits Regional 
Court. The case was postponed for trial on 8 and 9 October 2008. 
The state again sought the postponement in order to obtain 
intermediary reports. 
 On 8 October 2008 the trial was once more postponed to 23 March 
2009 due to the unavailability of an interpreter. At the hearing the 
applicant's counsel applied to the court for the applicant to have 
access to a test done by the social worker on the complainants, and 
handed in a list of the documents to which access was sought 
(Annexure "A"). The prosecutor at the time had no objection to the 
request and the court ordered that "the defence be supplied with all 
the issues and documentation raised in the list annexed hereto [as] 
Annexure 'A'". The prosecutor and the applicant's legal 
representative agreed that the state would supply the defence with 
the relevant documentation on 17 October 2008. The prosecutor, 
however, failed to do so. 
 On 11 November 2008 a meeting was held between all the parties to 
discuss amongst other things the discovery of the documents listed 
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in Annexure "A". The applicant's counsel requested assistance in 
obtaining these documents. 
 After the meeting the fourth respondent, who had been appointed to 
conduct the trial in the Brits Regional Court, perused the docket and 
established that the documents listed in Annexure "A" did not form 
part of the police/court docket, neither were they in the state's 
possession, but they were in the possession of the sixth and or 
seventh respondents ie the social worker and her employer the 
Teddy Bear Clinic. The fourth respondent communicated with the 
investigating officer to establish what the situation regarding the 
documents was and was informed by him that the sixth and seventh 
respondents would not make the documents available as they were 
regarded by the two respondents as private and confidential. 
Nevertheless, the investigating officer did obtain pro forma 
documents (structural questions and anatomical drawings) and an 
explanatory note made by the seventh respondent with regards to 
the techniques used to assess the complainants. 
 The third respondent, representing the office of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions, faxed these documents to the applicant's attorney on 
1 December 2008. This was done under cover of a letter pointing out 
that the state had never been in possession of the documents listed 
in Annexure "A" and that counsel for the state had been informed that 
the documents were private and confidential and would not be made 
available to the state or the defence. 
 The applicant subsequently referred the matter to the North Gauteng 
High Court in the form of a notice of motion. The applicant inter alia 
sought final relief in the form of an order that the second respondent 
(the Minister of Safety and Security) and/or the third respondent (the 
Director of Public Prosecutions) and/or the fourth respondent (Adv J 
Cronje) and/or the fifth respondent (Captain Collin Morris, Randburg 
SAPS) be found in contempt of the court orders of 12 June 2008 and 
8 October 2009; directing them to forthwith comply with such court 
orders, as well as an order directing the sixth and seventh 
respondents to make the contents of the docket, such contents as 
are in their possession, as well as the documents contained in 
Annexure "A" attached to the notice of motion available to the 
applicant. 
M BEKINK  PER / PELJ 2017 (20)  7 
3 Issues of law 
The three main issues before the North Gauteng High Court were firstly 
whether the aforementioned respondents were in contempt of court, 
secondly whether the seventh respondent's working papers containing the 
raw data used by her to compile her reports formed part of the police docket, 
and thirdly whether the applicant had demonstrated a right to the disclosure 
of the documents listed in Annexure "A". 
As the focus of this paper is on the latter two issues, namely whether the 
seventh respondent's working papers containing the raw data used by her 
to compile her reports formed part of the police docket and whether the 
applicant had demonstrated a right to the disclosure of the documents, 
suffice it to say that with regards to the first issue the court found that the 
applicant's claim for relief based on contempt of court had not been 
successfully proven and could therefore not succeed.13 
With regards to the second and third issues, to make out a case for the 
substantive relief sought by the applicant, the applicant had to demonstrate 
that he had a right to access to the documents sought. In support of this the 
applicant's counsel argued that the documents listed in Annexure "A" (the 
working papers containing the raw data of the seventh respondent used to 
compile her reports) formed part of the police docket. The applicant's 
counsel furthermore contended that in the light of the order of the Brits 
District Court of 12 June 2008 that the whole docket be disclosed to the 
applicant, the sixth and seventh respondents were obliged to make the 
documents available. 
In support of their arguments the applicant's counsel relied on the rules laid 
down in the judgement of Shabalala v Attorney-General of Transvaal,14 in 
which the Constitutional Court sets out the legal position with regard to the 
disclosure of documents in a police docket, as well as section 32 of the 
Constitution, which provides that "everyone has the right of access to… - 
(b) any information that is held by another person and that is required for 
the exercise or protection of any rights". The applicant's counsel made no 
reference to the provisions of the Promotion of Access to Information Act.15 
                                            
13  Kerkhoff para [13]. 
14  Shabalala v Attorney-General of Transvaal 1996 1 SA 725 (CC) (hereinafter referred 
to as Shabalala). 
15  Promotion to Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (hereinafter referred to as PAIA). 
See Kerkhoff para [15]. PAIA was enacted to give effect to the constitutional right to 
access to information held by both private and public bodies. PAIA seeks to give effect 
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The North Gauteng High Court considered the rules as laid down in 
Shabala, but found that the documents listed in Annexure "A" (the working 
papers containing the raw data of the seventh respondent used to compile 
her reports) did not form part of the police docket and were thus not covered 
by the decision in the said case. As far as section 32 of the Constitution was 
concerned, the court held that the applicant's counsel did not provide any 
authority for the proposition that the applicant was entitled to simply rely on 
this section in the Constitution whilst ignoring the provisions of PAIA, which 
was enacted to give effect to section 32 of the Constitution. The court, and 
rightly so, with reference to the case of Institute for Democracy in South 
Africa v ANC16 found that parties must assert the right to access to 
information via PAIA and that section 32 is therefore not capable of serving 
as an independent legal basis or cause of action for the enforcement of 
rights to access to information.17 As the applicant had failed to make use of 
PAIA and no right to access to the documents had been demonstrated, the 
High Court dismissed the application.18 
4 Analysis and comments 
In assessing the judgement under discussion, it is submitted that the 
decision and conclusions in Kerkhoff are correct and should be supported. 
In this regard I should like to highlight four aspects of the case which are of 
importance and warrant further discussion. 
Firstly, Southwood J highlighted that the police docket is comprised of three 
sections: section A (containing the witnesses' statements taken by the 
investigating officer, expert reports and documentary exhibits), section B 
(containing witnesses' reports and memoranda), and section C (containing 
the investigation diary). The court accordingly held, and appropriately so, 
that the documents listed in Annexure "A" namely the working papers 
containing the raw data of the seventh respondent used to compile her 
                                            
to this right subject to justifiable limitations in a manner which balances the right to 
access to information with any other rights, including the rights set out in the Bill of 
Rights. PAIA also aims to establish voluntary and mandatory mechanisms or 
procedures which enable a person to obtain access to the records of private or public 
bodies as swiftly, inexpensively and effortlessly as is reasonably possible. In so doing 
PAIA aspires to change the secretive, unresponsive culture of the pre-democratic era 
into a culture of transparency, accountability and effective governance. See s 9 of 
PAIA. 
16  Institute for Democracy in South Africa v ANC 2005 5 SA 39 (C) (hereinafter referred 
to as Institute for Democracy). 
17  Kerkhoff para [17]. Also see the court's references to Currie and Klaaren PAIA 
Commentary para 2.12 in support of its conclusion. 
18  Kerkhoff paras [18]-[19]. 
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reports did not form part of the police docket and were thus not covered by 
the rules in Shabalala. The court fittingly concluded that the applicant had 
failed to demonstrate a right to access to the documents in terms of 
Shabalala.19 
Secondly, Southwood J reaffirmed that the purpose of section 170A of the 
Criminal Procedure Act is to determine whether an intermediary should be 
appointed in order to prevent a child from being exposed to undue mental 
stress or suffering whilst having to testify. The learned judge suitably drew 
attention to the fact that an enquiry in terms of section 170A of the Criminal 
Procedure Act has a narrow focus, namely to determine whether it is in the 
best interests of the child that an intermediary be appointed. The enquiry is 
not concerned with whether the child is competent to give evidence or 
whether the child's evidence is admissible, credible or reliable.20 The 
alleged purposes of the applicant to obtain the documents, namely "to 
challenge the complainants' competence to give evidence, credibility and 
admissibility of their evidence at trial within a trial during the proceedings" 
or "to make representations to the Director of Public Prosecutions regarding 
the withdrawal of the prosecution" were misconceived.21 The procedure 
envisaged in section 170A does not allow for a trial within a trial of the nature 
contemplated by the applicant's legal counsel. The issues of the child 
witness's competence, admissibility, credibility and reliability were separate 
issues which were to be decided, in the light of all the evidence, by the trial 
court in the course of the trial itself.22 
The aforementioned approach, the court stated,23 with reference to DPP v 
Minister of Justice,24 not only protects child complainants from unnecessary 
trauma, but helps to ensure that the trial court receives evidence that is more 
freely presented, more likely to be true, and more likely to be better 
understood by the court. The fairness of the trial accordingly stood to be 
enhanced rather than impeded by the use of section 170A of the Criminal 
Procedure Act. The special procedures contemplated in section 170A 
should consequently not be seen as justifiable limitations on the right to a 
fair trial, but as conducive to a trial that was fair to all.25 
                                            
19  Kerkhoff paras [9], [16]-[17]. 
20  Kerkhoff para [21]. 
21  Kerkhoff para [21]. 
22  Kerkhoff para [21]. 
23  Kerkhoff para [6]. 
24  DPP v Minister of Justice para [116]. 
25  Kerkhoff para [6]. 
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Thirdly, as was stated before, the sixth and seventh respondents claimed 
that the documentation referred to in Annexure "A", namely the working 
papers which contained the raw data used by the seventh respondent to 
compile her report, were private and confidential.26 This raised the question 
of whether the communications between a child complainant and the person 
tasked with compiling a report pertaining to the appointment of an 
intermediary are subject to professional privilege. This question was 
unfortunately not addressed by the North Gauteng High Court. 
As a general rule professional privilege applies only to the lawyer-client 
relationship and is not enjoyed (at least to the same degree) by other 
professional relationships.27 The Criminal Procedure Act in its current form 
does not prescribe who will be regarded as a competent person to compile 
a report assisting the court in its task to determine whether an intermediary 
should be appointed28 and thus the possibility exists that this task may be 
performed by a legal advisor (such as an advocate in the office of the Family 
Advocate) specialising in child law. However, for a child complainant to be 
able to claim the professional lawyer-client privilege, the communication 
between the child and the legal advisor must, in terms of the requirements 
for the operation of the privilege, have been made for the purpose of 
obtaining legal advice.29 As this is clearly not the purpose of the 
communications between the child complainant and the legal advisor this 
may result in the child not being able to claim the common law professional 
privilege. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that the task of compiling a report for the 
appointment of an intermediary is usually performed by a social worker or a 
psychologist.30 A review of the statutory law as well as the common law 
reveals no established professional privilege between a social worker and 
a child complainant and/or a psychologist and a child complainant in this 
capacity. This can perhaps be attributed to the fact that the use or function 
of an intermediary in terms of section 170A of the Criminal Procedure Act is 
                                            
26  Kerkhoff para [12](11). 
27  Schwikkard "Evidence" para 52-69. 
28  Note that the Criminal Procedure Act prescribes only who will be regarded as a 
competent person to be appointed as an intermediary - see s 170A4(a) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act; GN R137 in GG 150 of 30 July 1990, as amended by GN R360 in GG 
1782 of 28 February 1997, as amended by GN R597 in GG 2 2435 of 2 July 2001. 
29  Lane v Magistrate, Wynberg 1997 2 SA 869 (C); also see Zeffert and Paizes Essential 
Evidence 203-204 for more on the requirements for the operation of the privilege. 
30  See for example Kerkhoff; K v the Regional Court Magistrate 1996 1 SACR 434 (E) 
(hereinafter referred to as Regional Court Magistrate); S v Mokoena; S v Phaswane 
2008 2 SACR 216 (T); S v SN 2012 2 SACR 317 (GNP); S v Peyani 2014 2 SACR 
127 (GP) (hereinafter referred to as Peyani). 
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still a fairly new concept31 and that the necessity of such a privilege has not 
been an issue until fairly recently. 
Conversely, even if such a professionally-based privilege at common law 
may fail, some professional communications may be protected from 
disclosure by the constitutional right to privacy.32 Section 14(d) of the 
Constitution provides that everyone has the right not to have the privacy of 
their communications infringed. A communication between a social 
worker/psychologist and a child complainant in this capacity may well be 
regarded as a personal and private communication, as children, their 
guardians and their parents approach such a social worker/psychologist in 
the confidence that their communications with the social 
worker/psychologist will not be disclosed. Such confidentiality is essential to 
the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relationship between the social 
worker/psychologist and the child who seeks the social 
worker's/psychologist's assistance.33 The relationship between the child 
complainant and the social worker/psychologist is clearly one that should 
be sedulously fostered and a case can be made out that the disclosure of 
the communication would not be consistent with the principle that the best 
interests of the child are of paramount importance in criminal proceedings.34 
The best interests of the child principle is both a self-standing right and a 
guiding principle in all matters affecting children.35 This has been confirmed 
by the Constitutional Court's application of the best interest principle in a 
variety of cases involving children's rights, including children's right to 
privacy.36 The post-constitutional position may therefore, in view of the 
constitutional recognised right to privacy and the paramountcy of the best 
interests of the child principle, be different from the common law position. 
Where an accused seeks to compel the disclosure of a communication of a 
personal and private nature, the child complainant may accordingly assert 
that a privilege attaches to the child's relationship with the social 
                                            
31  Section 170A of the Criminal Procedure Act was inserted by s 3 of the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act 135 of 1991 and came into operation on 30 July 1993. 
32  Schwikkard "Evidence" para 52-69. 
33  Kerkhoff para [12](11). 
34  See s 28(2) of the Constitution. See for example Bekink and Bekink 2004 De Jure 21; 
Heaton 1990 THRHR 95; Ferreira 2010 THRHR 201 for more on the best interest of 
the child principle. 
35  Minister of Welfare and Population Development v Fitzpatrick 2000 3 SA 422 (CC) 
paras [17]-[18]. 
36  Also see for example Johncom Media Investments Ltd v M 2009 4 SA 7 (CC); Teddy 
Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 
2014 2 SA 168 (CC), where the Constitutional Court emphasised the importance of 
this principle in relation to the privacy of children. 
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worker/psychologist in terms of section 14 of the Constitution. However, the 
prima facie recognition of the privilege may be limited if the accused is able 
to persuade the court that the limitation of this right is justified when the 
accused's right to a fair trial is weighed up against the minor's rights. In order 
to succeed, the accused will have to prove on a balance of probabilities that 
unless the information is obtained, the accused's right to a fair trial will be 
irreparably infringed.37 
It is submitted that in the light of the fact that the communication between 
the child witness and the social worker/psychologist pertaining to the 
appointment of an intermediary does not form part of the police docket and 
the state's case against an accused, its non-disclosure does not irreparably 
infringe an accused's right to a fair trial.38 The Constitutional Court in DPP v 
Minister of Justice39 furthermore emphasised that the fairness of a trial 
stands to be enhanced rather than impeded by the use of the procedures 
set out in section 170A. The procedures should therefore not be seen as 
justifiable limitations to a fair trial, but instead as being conducive to a fair 
trial. 
It should also be remembered that the purpose of the communication 
between the child complainant and the social worker/psychologist is for the 
social worker/ psychologist to evaluate the child's linguistic, cognitive and 
emotional development as well as to determine whether the child will suffer 
undue mental stress or suffering if he or she testifies at the hearing.40 A 
significant part of the communication between the child complainant and the 
social worker/psychologist may therefore not only be private and personal 
but totally unrelated to the case at hand. Justification for the reasonable and 
justifiable limitation of section 14 of the Constitution in terms of section 36 
of the Constitution read together with section 28(2) of the Constitution will 
in my view therefore not be easily asserted. A child complainant's 
communication with a social worker/psychologist in this regard may hence 
muster constitutional protection in terms of the child's constitutional right to 
privacy. 
                                            
37  Prinsloo v Bramley Children's Home 2005 5 SA 119 (T) 128B-D (hereinafter referred 
to as Bramley Children's Home).  
38  Kerkhoff para [6]. 
39  DPP v Minister of Justice para [116]. 
40  DPP v Minister of Justice para [94]. 
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Fourthly, the judgement is supported in terms of the approach followed by 
the court with regards to the determination of the applicant's right to access 
to information, namely that: 
… s 32 of the Constitution provides the underlying basis for and informs the 
rights contained in PAIA, but that the section itself is subsumed by PAIA, which 
now regulates the right of access to information; that parties must assert the 
right via the Act.41 
The court correctly held that the applicant had to seek access to the 
documents listed in Annexure "A" in accordance with the provisions of PAIA. 
Only if it turned out that the provisions of PAIA did not apply would the 
applicant be able to follow other avenues.42 As the applicant had failed to 
make use of the provisions of PAIA the North Gauteng Court did not 
undertake an assessment of the provisions of PAIA in order to determine its 
application to the case under discussion. This is unfortunate as it leaves an 
uncertainty as to whether the outcome of the case would have been different 
if the provisions of PAIA had been applied. It will consequently be of value 
to evaluate the provisions of PAIA.43 
5  PAIA 
Before April 1994 the nature of the system of government in South African 
resulted in the development of a secretive and unresponsive culture in 
public and private bodies which often led to an abuse of power and the 
violation of human rights.44 This position was altered through the 
commencement of a new constitutional dispensation45 and specifically the 
enactment of section 32(1) of the Constitution, which provides that: 
Everyone has the right to access to any information held by the state; and any 
information that is held by another person and that is required for the exercise 
or protection of any rights. 
In terms of section 32(2) of the Constitution, national legislation must be 
enacted to give effect to the right to access to information. PAIA is the 
national legislation contemplated in section 32(2) of the Constitution and 
was enacted to give effect to this right.46 PAIA does this by distinguishing in 
                                            
41  See Kerkhoff para [17]; Institute for Democracy para [17]. 
42  Kerkhoff para [18]. 
43  It should be noted that the purpose of this discussion is not to give a detailed 
discussion of PAIA, but to do so with reference to the Kerkhoff case. 
44  See the Preamble of PAIA. Also see Hoexter Administrative Law 95. 
45  First by s 23 of the Interim Constitution, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
Act 200 of 1993 and later by s 32(1) of the Constitution. 
46  Large parts of PAIA came into effect in March 2001. See Proc R20 in GG 22125 of 9 
March 2001.  
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section 1 between private and public bodies. On the basis of this distinction 
PAIA is then divided roughly into two parts, namely the provisions dealing 
with the right to access to information held by public bodies on the one 
hand,47 and on the other, provisions dealing with the right to access to 
information held by private bodies.48 
This right was soon relied upon in a variety of contexts and a body of case 
law developed rapidly, in particular that of accused persons who sought 
access to information contained in police dockets.49 It should be noted that 
in terms of section 32 (1) of the Constitution, the right to access to 
information in state hands is unqualified, whilst the right to access to 
information held by other persons (ie private persons) is qualified in that the 
information must be required for the exercise or protection of any rights. It 
must be borne in mind that the right to access to information held by either 
a public or private body may be limited to the extent that the limitations are 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom, as contemplated in section 36 of the 
Constitution. 
PAIA starts out by defining important terms such as personal information, 
request for access, public body, private body, and requester. Of particular 
importance is the fact that PAIA takes the Constitution's concept of 
"information" and narrows it down, in that the Act does not apply to 
information but rather to the "record". This is defined in section 1 of PAIA as 
information that has been recorded by a private or public body regardless 
of the form or medium of that record.50 As the meaning of the word "record" 
is defined in PAIA to include any form or medium of that record, the working 
papers containing the raw data used by the person responsible for compiling 
a report as to the merits of the appointment of an intermediary or not may 
be regarded by the courts in terms of PAIA as part of the "record" of the 
communication between such a person and the child complainant. 
PAIA then sets out certain general rules of application. In terms of section 5 
of PAIA the provisions of the Act apply to the exclusion of any provision of 
other legislation that prohibits or restricts the disclosure of a record of a 
                                            
47  See part 2 of PAIA. 
48  See part 3 of PAIA. 
49  Hoexter Administartive Law 95. Also see for example Jeeva v Receiver of Revenue, 
Port Elizabeth 1995 2 SA 433 (SE) 44ff; Phato v Attorney-General Eastern Cape 1995 
1 SA 799 (E) 815D. 
50  Hoexter Administrative Law 97-98. See also Garden Cities Inc v City of Cape Town 
2009 6 SA 33 (C); Claase v Information Officer, South African Airways 2007 5 SA 496 
(SCA). 
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public or private body. Section 7 of PAIA introduces an internal limitation of 
the Act in that the section determines that PAIA does not apply in particular 
circumstances. In terms of section 7(1) of PAIA: 
 This Act does not apply to records of a public or a private body if- 
(a) that record is requested for the purpose of criminal or civil 
proceedings; 
(b) so requested after commencement of such criminal or civil 
proceedings, as the case may be, and  
(c) the production of or access to that record for the purpose referred 
to in paragraph (a) is provided for in any other law. 
All three of the requirements of section 7(1) must be met in order to render 
the provisions of PAIA inapplicable.51 In PFE International the Constitutional 
Court highlighted52 that the purpose of section 7(1) is: 
to prevent PAIA from having any impact on the law relating to discovery or 
compulsion of evidence in civil and criminal proceedings. In the event that the 
production of or access to the record is provided for in any other law then the 
exemption takes effect. The legislature has framed s 7 in terms intended to 
convey that requests for access to records, made for the purpose of litigation, 
and after litigation has commenced, should be regulated by the rules of court 
governing such access in the course of litigation. 
This underscores the fact that PAIA was not intended to have any impact 
on the discovery procedure in civil and criminal cases, and that once 
litigation has commenced discovery should be regulated by the rules of 
court governing such access.53 The fact that PAIA does not apply in criminal 
matters is of importance. PAIA can therefore not be used to obtain access 
to information where it is required for pending civil or criminal proceedings 
and where access to it is provided for in another "law". The Supreme Court 
of Appeal with reference to Unitas Hospital v Van Wyk54 reiterated this 
position in Director of Public Prosecutions v King,55 where it was found that 
"other law" refers to the body of law which includes the rules relating to 
discovery, disclosure and privilege. The court accordingly held that if access 
to information is required for the purpose of criminal proceedings, the right 
                                            
51  See PFE International v Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Ltd 2013 
1 SA 1 (CC) para [19] (hereinafter referred to as PFE International). 
52  PFE International para [21]. 
53  See Unitas Hospital v Van Wyk 2006 4 SA 436 (SCA); PFE International; MEC for 
Roads and Public Works, Eastern Cape v Intertrade Two (Pty) Ltd 2006 5 SA 1 (SCA). 
54  Unitas Hospital v Van Wyk 2006 4 SA 436 (SCA). 
55  Director of Public Prosecutions v King 2010 2 SACR 146 (SCA) para [39]. 
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thereto had to be sought elsewhere; for example, through the rules of 
discovery.56 
Since rule 38(1) of the Uniform Rules of Court constitutes such a "law" as 
contemplated in section 7(1)(c) of PAIA, a request for access to information 
should be made in terms of the Uniform Rules of Court and not in terms of 
PAIA. PAIA does not apply in such an instance. To hold otherwise, the 
Constitutional Court pointed out, would result in a dual system of access to 
information, in terms of both PAIA and the particular court rules, and this 
would be disruptive to court proceedings.57 
It is submitted that the three conditions set out in section 7(1) of PAIA, which 
must be met for PAIA not to apply, will in all probability be satisfied if the 
Kerkhoff case (or a future case similar to that of the Kerkhoff case) is to be 
decided in terms of PAIA. The documents listed in Annexure "A" of the 
motion were requested for the purpose of a criminal proceeding; were so 
requested after the commencement of the proceedings; and access to the 
record is provided for in other law. If a determination in terms of PAIA is 
indeed made, an applicant such as the applicant in Kerkhoff would have to 
make use of other law governing the rules of court, for example a rule 38(1) 
application. If the respondent in such an instance refuses to make the 
documents available, the issue of whether the applicant would be entitled 
to the documents would have to be determined by the trial court. It should, 
however, be noted that applicants are entitled to obtain information from a 
third party to the litigation in terms of a rule 38(1) application only if the 
evidence is relevant to the dispute between the parties to the litigation.58 It 
is questionable, however, whether a respondent's working papers which 
contain the raw data used to compile a report as to the appointment of an 
intermediary, and which do not form part of the police docket, would be 
regarded as relevant to the dispute between the parties. A rule 38(1) 
application may accordingly also not suffice. 
Although it is submitted that PAIA would not be applicable to the 
circumstances referred to in the case under discussion, it is perhaps also of 
value to have regard to the position if PAIA would apply. Two scenarios may 
be envisaged, as the person tasked with compiling a report pertaining to the 
appointment of an intermediary may either be in the employment of the state 
(for example, a social worker in the employment of the Department of Social 
                                            
56  Director of Public Prosecutions v King 2010 2 SACR 146 (SCA) para [39]. 
57  PFE International paras [31]-[32]. 
58  Bramley Children's Home para [36]; Meyers v Marcus 2004 5 SA 315 (C). 
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Work) or may be in the employment of a private body (for example a social 
worker in the employment of a NGO such as the Teddy Bear Clinic). 
The procedure allowing an individual to give effect to the individual's 
constitutional right to access to information in terms of PAIA is set out 
respectively in section 11 for the records held by a public body and in section 
50 for the records held by a private body. The body that receives the request 
must grant access to the record unless grounds for refusing the request 
exist. PAIA lists a number of grounds on which a request for access can or, 
in some cases, must be refused.59 In so doing PAIA recognises that there 
are reasonable and justifiable limitations on the right to access to 
information, even in an open and democratic society.60 The relevant 
grounds for refusal to grant access to the records of public bodies, namely 
sections 34(1), 37(1) and 40, will be discussed first, whereafter the relevant 
grounds for refusal to grant access to the records of private bodies, namely 
sections 63, 65, 66 and 67, will be discussed. 
The information officer of a public body (such as a social worker in the 
employment of the Department of Social Works) must refuse a request for 
access to the records contemplated in sections 34(1), 37(1) and 40. Section 
34(1) provides for the mandatory protection of the privacy of a third party, in 
that an information officer of a public body must refuse a request for access 
to a record of the body, if its disclosure would involve the unreasonable 
disclosure of personal information about a third party. Section 37(1) 
provides for the mandatory protection of certain confidential information 
owed to a third party, in that an information officer of a public body must 
refuse a request for access to a record of the body if the disclosure of the 
record would constitute an action for the breach of a duty of confidence 
owed to a third party in terms of an agreement. Section 40 provides for the 
mandatory protection of records privileged from production in legal 
proceedings, in that an information officer of a public body must refuse a 
request for access to a record of the body if the record is privileged from 
production in legal proceedings, unless the person entitled to the privilege 
has waived the privilege. 
A public officer's working papers containing the raw data used to compile a 
report as to the appointment of an intermediary may fall within the 
aforementioned grounds for a refusal to grant access to the records of public 
bodies. The communication between a child complainant and a public 
                                            
59  See ss 34-46 of PAIA for public bodies and ss 64-70 for private bodies. 
60  President of the Republic of South Africa v M & G Media Ltd 2012 2 SA 50 (CC) para 
[11] (hereinafter referred to as M & G Media). 
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officer such as a social worker in the employment of the Department of 
Social Development will as of necessity contain certain private information 
and may therefore be seen as confidential. The social worker in the Kerkhoff 
case alluded to this fact by pointing out that a policy ("agreement") exists in 
terms of which the relevant documents are considered to be private and 
confidential.61 This confidentiality is essential to maintaining a professional 
relationship between the person tasked with compiling a report as to the 
appointment of an intermediary and the child complainant seeking the 
person's assistance.62 As was stated above the person tasked with 
compiling a report as to the appointment of an intermediary for the child 
complainant may assert that a constitutional privilege attaches to their 
relationship, bringing it within the realms of the mandatory protection of 
records privileged from production in legal proceedings. 
The head of a private body (such as the Teddy Bear Clinic) must refuse a 
request for access to the records of the body contemplated in sections 63, 
65, 66 and 67 of PAIA. Section 63(1) provides for the mandatory protection 
of the privacy of a third party, in that the head of a private body must refuse 
a request for access to a record of the body if its disclosure would involve 
the unreasonable disclosure of personal information about a third party. 
Section 65 provides for the mandatory protection of certain confidential 
information owed to a third party, in that a head of a private body must refuse 
a request for access to a record of the body if the disclosure of the record 
would constitute an action for breach of a duty of confidence owed to a third 
party in terms of an agreement. Section 66 provides for the mandatory 
protection of the safety of individuals, in that the head of a private body must 
refuse a request for access to a record of the body if its disclosure could 
reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of an 
individual. Section 67 provides for the mandatory protection of records 
privileged from production in legal proceedings in that the head of a private 
body must refuse a request for access to a record of the body if the record 
is privileged from production in legal proceedings, unless the person entitled 
to the privilege has waived the privilege. 
As the provisions applicable to private bodies are similar to those of public 
bodies (apart from the added protection in terms of section 66), the working 
papers containing the raw data used by a private person (such as a social 
worker in the employment of an NGO such as the Teddy Bear Clinic) 
assigned with the task to compile a report as to the appointment of an 
                                            
61  Kerkhoff para [12](11). 
62  Kerkhoff para [12](11). 
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intermediary may likewise fall within the aforementioned grounds for refusal 
of access to the records of a private body. It is therefore contended that an 
application for access to such records as were the subject of the Kerkhoff 
case would still not succeed even if PAIA were applicable. 
Lastly, cognisance should also be taken of section 80 of PAIA. Section 80(1) 
of PAIA determines that: 
Despite this Act and any other law, any court hearing and application, or any 
appeal against a decision on that application, may examine any record of a 
public or private body to which this Act applies, and no such record may be 
withheld from the court on any grounds. 
Section 80(1) affords a court hearing an application for access to 
information the discretionary power to examine any record of a public or 
private body. This affords courts what is referred to as a "judicial peek" into 
the specific record, and empowers them to independently review the record 
in order to assess the validity of an exemption claimed.63 This discretionary 
power must be exercised judiciously, with due regard to the constitutional 
right to access to information and the difficulties parties face in presenting 
and refuting evidence. The standard for assessing whether a court should 
invoke section 80(1) in a given case is whether it would be in the interests 
of justice to do so.64 However, a court contemplated in section 80(1) is duty 
bound in terms of section 80(2) not to disclose to any person, including the 
parties to the proceedings concerned, other than the public or private body 
referred to in subsection (1), any record of a public or private body, which 
on a request for access may or must be refused in terms of PAIA. A court 
responsible for assessing an application for access to the information such 
as was sought in Kerkhoff will therefore be able to independently review the 
working papers which contain the raw data used by the person tasked to 
compile a report as to the appointment of an intermediary, to assess the 
validity of exemptions claimed, whilst ensuring that the information 
contained in the record remains confidential. Only if an exemption claimed 
does not apply may the information be disclosed and will the applicant be 
entitled to view the contents thereof. This ensures that applicants are 
afforded access to information when an exemption does not apply while 
affording child complainants protection against the frivolous disclosure of 
the contents of their communications.65 
                                            
63  M & G Media para [41]. 
64  M & G Media para [45]. 
65  Requests that are "manifestly frivolous or vexatious" may be refused in terms of s 45 
of PAIA. 
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6 Subpoena duces tecum  
The court in the Kerkhoff case albeit obiter made a reference to the 
possibility of an alternative method to obtain the necessary information from 
the seventh respondent, namely that of a subpoena duces tecum.66 
In terms of section 179(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act, a prosecutor or 
an accused may compel the attendance of any person to give evidence or 
to produce any book, paper or document in criminal proceedings. In order 
to obtain the book, paper or document a subpoena is served on the person 
in whose possession the relevant item is. This subpoena, referred to as a 
subpoena duces tecum, is served in the same manner as an ordinary 
subpoena. The title of the book, paper or document required must be stated 
in the subpoena. This procedure is available to the prosecutor and the 
accused. A subpoena duces tecum may be issued by an accused on a state 
witness.67 
Section 179(1)(a) provides that a person may be compelled to produce the 
relevant item in criminal proceedings. Both rule 54(5) of the high court and 
rule 64(1) of the magistrate's court state that such a subpoena may be 
issued with regards to "any criminal case". Watney68 submits, which 
submission is supported, that the wording of section 179(1(a) could 
therefore be interpreted to provide for the attendance of a person in 
circumstances wider than just the trial itself. He points out that this is 
supported by the fact that a person attending court in terms of the subpoena 
duces tecum is not necessarily regarded as a witness unless he or she is 
required to testify to identify the document.69 
A person so subpoenaed is obliged to attend court with the document. Prior 
to being called as a witness such a person is entitled to keep the document 
under his or her control and may refuse to allow other parties to inspect it. 
In the event that such a person claims privilege of the document, the court 
                                            
66  Kerkhoff para [18]. 
67  Cave v Johannes 1949 1 SA 72 (T); Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal 
Procedure Act 23-2. 
68  Watney 2012 TSAR 329. 
69  Watney 2012TSAR 329. See also Picked Properties (Pty) Ltd v Northcliff Townships 
(Pty) Ltd 1972 3 SA 770 (W); Trust Sentrum (Kaapstad) (Edms) Bpk v Zevenberg 
1989 1 SA 145 (C). 
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will first have to decide on the validity of the claim before the person may be 
compelled to hand over the document.70 
It is submitted that the procedure of a subpoena duces tecum would be an 
appropriate alternative for an accused to obtain documents or information 
required for his or her defence where the documents or information do not 
form part of the police docket and are not in the possession of the state. The 
court in the Kerkhoff case stated that the accused could have issued a 
subpoena duces tecum to the seventh respondent to obtain the document. 
If the seventh respondent claimed privilege and refused to make the 
documents available, the court would have had to consider the reasons for 
the refusal and make an order as to whether or not the seventh respondent 
was obliged to hand over the documents.71 
However, even if a subpoena duces tecum is the correct approach for an 
accused to obtain the said documents, caution should be followed by the 
courts not to grant such an order readily but with due regard to the best 
interests of the child. As stated by Harms DP in Director of Public 
Prosecutions v King,72 "Fairness is not a one-way street conferring an 
unlimited right on an accused to demand the most favourable possible 
treatment but also requires fairness to the public as represented by the 
state". 
This is particularly true for children. 
7  Conclusion 
The introduction of the function of an intermediary in 1993 through the 
insertion of section 170A into the Criminal Procedure Act has proved to be 
a very welcome improvement to the plight of child complainants having to 
testify in criminal court cases.73 Section 170A(1) not only aims to prevent a 
child from undergoing undue mental stress or suffering while giving 
testimony, but is also designed to ensure the paramountcy of the best 
interests of the child complainant in criminal proceedings.74 
                                            
70  Bladen v Weston 1967 4 SA 429 (C); Trust Sentrum (Kaapstad) (Edms) Bpk v 
Zevenberg 1989 1 SA 145 (C). Also see Kruger et al Hiemstra's Criminal Procedure 
23-2. 
71  Kerkhoff para[18]. 
72  Director of Public Prosecutions v King 2010 2 SACR 146 (SCA) para [5]. 
73  See for example Regional Court Magistrate; Peyani. 
74  DPP v Minister of Justice paras [94]-[95]. 
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As is often the case with new legislative developments, certain secondary 
issues arise due to the practical application of the legislative provisions. 
Such an issue secondary to the primary purpose of section 170A arose as 
a result of the dispute in the Kerkhoff case, namely whether the working 
papers containing the raw data used by the person responsible for compiling 
a report as to the appointment of an intermediary in terms of section 170A 
should be seen as private and confidential, or whether an accused has a 
right to access to the said information. This secondary issue was 
unfortunately not addressed by the North Gauteng High Court in the 
Kerkhoff case other than to conclude and correctly so that an applicant has 
to assert a right to the said information in terms of PAIA. 
However, given the provisions of PAIA and the thoughts of the authorities 
mentioned above, it is concluded that PAIA will not come to the assistance 
of future applicants seeking to obtain access to the kind of information that 
was sought in the Kerkhoff case. In this regard a recourse to "other law", as 
contemplated in PAIA, such as a subpoena duces tecum, may prove to be 
the correct procedure. It is nonetheless imperative for the efficacy of section 
170A that the primary purpose or focus of the section, namely to determine 
whether or not it is in the best interest of a child complainant that an 
intermediary be appointed, should not be overlooked. Courts adjudicating 
over matters such as were the subject of the Kerkhoff case should be wary 
not to be side-tracked by secondary issues that could hamper the practical 
application of the primary purpose of section 170A. 
Bibliography 
Literature 
Bekink and Bekink 2004 De Jure 
Bekink B and Bekink M "Defining the Standard of the Best Interest of the 
Child: Modern South African Perspective" 2004 De Jure 21-40 
Currie and Klaaren PAIA Commentary  
Currie I and Klaaren J The Promotion of Access to Information Act - 
Commentary (Siber Ink Cape Town 2002) 
Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act  
Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act (Juta Cape Town 
2011) 
M BEKINK  PER / PELJ 2017 (20)  23 
Ferreira 2010 THRHR 
Ferreira S "The Best Interests of the Child: From Complete Indeterminacy 
to Guidance by the Children's Act" 2010 THRHR 201-213 
Heaton 1990 THRHR 
Heaton J "Some General Remarks on the Concept 'Best Interest of the 
Child'" 1990 THRHR 95-99 
Hoexter Administrative Law 
Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (Juta Cape Town 2012) 
Kruger et al Hiemstra's Criminal Procedure 
Kruger M et al Hiemstra's Criminal Procedure (LexisNexis Durban 2008) 
Matthias and Zaal 2011 Int'l J Child Rts 
Matthias CR and Zaal FN "Intermediaries for Child Witnesses: Old 
Problems, New Solutions and Judicial Differences in South Africa" 2011 Int'l 
J Child Rts 251-269 
Müller 2000 CARSA 
Müller K "The Effect of the Accusatorial System on the Child Witness" 2000 
CARSA 13-23 
Schwikkard 1996 Acta Juridica 
Schwikkard PJ "The Abused Child: A Few Rules of Evidence Considered" 
1996 Acta Juridica 148-162 
Schwikkard "Evidence" 
Schwikkard PJ "Evidence" in Woolman S and Bishop M Constitutional Law 
of South Africa (Juta Cape Town 2008) ch 52 
SALC Protection of the Child Witnesses 
South African Law Commission The Protection of the Child Witnesses - 
Project 71 (The Commission Pretoria 1991) 
Watney 2012TSAR 
Watney M "The Prosecution's Duty to Disclose: More Reason to Litigate?" 
2012 TSAR 320-330 
Zeffert and Paizes Essential Evidence 
Zeffert DT and Paizes A Essential Evidence (LexisNexis Durban 2010) 
M BEKINK  PER / PELJ 2017 (20)  24 
Case law 
Bladen v Weston 1967 4 SA 429 (C) 
Cave v Johannes 1949 1 SA 72 (T) 
Claase v Information Officer, South African Airways 2007 5 SA 496 (SCA) 
Director of Public Prosecutions v King 2010 2 SACR 146 (SCA) 
Director of Public Prosecutions v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development 2009 4 SA 222 (CC) 
Garden Cities Inc v City of Cape Town 2009 6 SA 33 (C) 
Institute for Democracy in South Africa v ANC 2005 5 SA 39 (C) 
Jeeva v Receiver of Revenue, Port Elizabeth 1995 2 SA 433 (SE) 
Johncom Media Investments Ltd v M 2009 4 SA 7 (CC) 
K v the Regional Court Magistrate 1996 1 SACR 434 (E) 
Kerkhoff v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2011 2 SACR 
109 (GP) 
Lane v Magistrate, Wynberg 1997 2 SA 869 (C) 
MEC for Roads and Public Works, Eastern Cape v Intertrade Two (Pty) Ltd 
2006 5 SA 1 (SCA) 
Meyers v Marcus 2004 5 SA 315 (C) 
Minister of Welfare and Population Development v Fitzpatrick 2000 3 SA 
422 (CC) 
PFE International v Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Ltd 
2013 1 SA 1 (CC) 
Phato v Attorney-General Eastern Cape 1995 1 SA 799 (E) 
Picked Properties (Pty) Ltd v Northcliff Townships (Pty) Ltd 1972 3 SA 770 
(W) 
President of the Republic of South Africa v M & G Media Ltd 2012 2 SA 50 
(CC) 
M BEKINK  PER / PELJ 2017 (20)  25 
Prinsloo v Bramley Children's Home 2005 5 SA 119 (T) 
S v Mokoena; S v Phaswane 2008 2 SACR 216 (T) 
S v Peyani 2014 2 SACR 127 (GP) 
S v SN 2012 2 SACR 317 (GNP) 
Shabalala v Attorney-General of Transvaal 1996 1 SA 725 (CC) 
Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development 2014 2 SA 168 (CC) 
Trust Sentrum (Kaapstad) (Edms) Bpk v Zevenberg 1989 1 SA 145 (C) 
Unitas Hospital v Van Wyk 2006 4 SA 436 (SCA) 
Legislation 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 
Criminal Law Amendment Act 135 of 1991 
Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 
2007 
Promotion to Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 
Government publications 
GN R137 in GG 150 of 30 July 1990 
GN R360 in GG 1782 of 28 February 1997 
GN R597 in GG 2 2435 of 2 July 2001 
Proc R20 in GG 22125 of 9 March 2001 
List of Abbreviations 
CARSA Child Abuse Research in South Africa 
Int'l J Child Rts International Journal of Children's Rights 
M BEKINK  PER / PELJ 2017 (20)  26 
PAIA Promotion to Access to Information Act 2 of 
2000 
SALC South African Law Commission 
THRHR Tydskrif vir die Hedendaagse Romeins-
Hollandse Reg 
TSAR Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 
 
